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Abstract
Background: The last two decades have seen a growing recognition of the need to expand the impact evaluation
toolbox from an exclusive focus on randomized controlled trials to including quasi-experimental approaches. This
appears to be particularly relevant when evaluation complex health interventions embedded in real-life settings often
characterized by multiple research interests, limited researcher control, concurrently implemented policies and
interventions, and other internal validity-threatening circumstances. To date, however, most studies described
in the literature have employed either an exclusive experimental or an exclusive quasi-experimental approach.
Methods: This paper presents the case of a study design exploiting the respective advantages of both approaches by
combining experimental and quasi-experimental elements to evaluate the impact of a Performance-Based Financing
(PBF) intervention in Burkina Faso. Specifically, the study employed a quasi-experimental design (pretest-posttest with
comparison) with a nested experimental component (randomized controlled trial). A difference-in-differences approach
was used as the main analytical strategy.
Discussion: We aim to illustrate a way to reconcile scientific and pragmatic concerns to generate policy-relevant evidence
on the intervention’s impact, which is methodologically rigorous in its identification strategy but also considerate
of the context within which the intervention took place. In particular, we highlight how we formulated our research
questions, ultimately leading our design choices, on the basis of the knowledge needs expressed by the policy
and implementing stakeholders. We discuss methodological weaknesses of the design arising from contextual
constraints and the accommodation of various interests, and how we worked ex-post to address them to the best extent
possible to ensure maximal accuracy and credibility of our findings. We hope that our case may be inspirational for other
researchers wishing to undertake research in settings where field circumstances do not appear to be ideal for an impact
evaluation.
Trial registration: Registered with RIDIE (RIDIE-STUDY-ID-54412a964bce8) on 10/17/2014.
Keywords: Burkina Faso, Performance-based financing, Randomized controlled trial, Quasi-experiment, Difference-
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Background
In the year 2000, the Medical Research Council (MRC)
issued guidelines to orient researchers interested in the
evaluation of complex health interventions. The abridged
version of the MRC guidelines published by Campbell and
colleagues [1] drew wide attention to the need to identify
an adequate framework for the design and evaluation of
complex interventions aimed at improving health. They
defined complex interventions as health interventions that
rely on multiple components not fully under the re-
searcher’s control. While undoubtedly deserving the merit
of first drawing attention to the special circumstances
under which complex health interventions are undertaken
in comparison to standard clinical trials, the early work by
Campbell and colleagues reinforced the central role of
randomized trials in evaluation research rather that to
encourage a broadening of the methodological toolbox.
In response to the widespread debate spurred by their
publication [2–4], the initial MRC guidelines were sub-
stantially revised in 2008 [5, 6], with the explicit object-
ive of paying closer attention to the relationship between
implementation processes and outcome evaluation. The
revised guidelines included specific guidance to researchers
when choosing between randomized and non-randomized
designs and drew attention to the need to invest in com-
plementary process evaluations while assessing an inter-
vention’s impact.
The development of the MRC guidelines over time
reflects an overall evolution in the literature. Although
randomized controlled trials continue to play a key role
in impact evaluation [7–9], researchers today acknow-
ledge the need to think beyond the narrow framework of
randomization and have come to rely increasingly more
often on quasi-experiments when called to evaluate the
impact of complex health interventions [10–14].
It is surprising, however, that little attention has so far
been paid to how experiments and quasi-experiments can
be combined within a single study design. The existing
literature presents experiments and quasi-experiments as
alternative means of achieving a given evaluation objective
rather than viewing the two as complementary approaches
to be combined when in need to evaluate complex health
interventions [15–18]. Combining the two appears to be
particularly relevant considering that complex health
interventions are not implemented in a vacuum, but occur
within real-life settings often characterized by limited
researcher control, concurrently implemented policies and
interventions, and other internal validity-threatening
circumstances.
This paper presents the case of a study design combin-
ing experimental and quasi-experimental elements to
evaluate the impact of a Performance-Based Financing
(PBF) intervention in Burkina Faso. In line with the work
by Habicht et al. [19], we use the case to elucidate how
the design decisions our research team (Institute of Glo-
bal Health, Heidelberg University, Germany, and Centre
MURAZ, Burkina Faso) made were guided by the know-
ledge needs of the policy makers on behalf of whom we
conducted the impact evaluation between 2013 and
2017. Specifically, we illustrate how experimental and
quasi-experimental elements were combined within a
single evaluation design to answer different research
questions while respecting the context within which the
implementation of the intervention took place. We describe
the trade-offs that arose when trying to accommodate both
the multiple research interests and the realities of the
context and the intervention itself, as well as the analytical
techniques we applied to address them. In doing so, we
intend our case to serve as an illustration for other re-
searchers planning to conduct rigorous impact evaluations
in settings where circumstances do not appear ideal and/or
where multiple research interests need to be reconciled
within a single study.
Methods
Study setting
In order to understand the intervention and the design
decisions we made within the framework of our impact
evaluation, we first provide some background informa-
tion on the country and its health system.
Burkina Faso is a landlocked country located in West
Africa, with a population of 18.5 million. At the time the
study was planned, the country’s GDP per capita stood
at USD 1560 (2013, adjusted for purchasing power par-
ity) placing it among the poorest countries in the world
[20]. The 2014 Human Development Index ranked Bur-
kina Faso 185 out of 188 countries [21].
In spite of substantial improvements over the course
of the last few years, health indicators still largely lag
behind regional averages. Life expectancy is at 58 years.
Maternal and under-five mortality are estimated at 371/
100,000 [22] and 102/1000 [23], respectively. Malaria,
acute respiratory infections, and diarrhea still account
for the largest proportion of child mortality, often coupled
with an underlying situation of malnutrition, with nearly
40% of all children being classified as stunted.
Health service delivery is organized in a three-tier
system, with primary facilities (Centre de Santé et
Promotion Sociale - CSPS) located in rural areas; district
hospitals located in each district capital; and regional
and national referral hospitals located in the regional
capitals and in the national capital Ouagadougou [24].
Public facilities provide the vast majority of health ser-
vices [25].
The health sector suffers from a generalized lack of re-
sources. In 2013, total per capita health expenditure was
estimated at 6.4% of GDP, equivalent to Purchasing Power
Parity USD 109. Government expenditure amounted to
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58% of total health expenditure, including contributions
by development partners being estimated at 23% of this
total. Private health expenditure is substantial as user
charges continue to be applied across a variety of essential
healthcare services, with more than 80% of all private ex-
penditure on health not being channeled through pre-paid
and pooled mechanisms [26, 27].
The poor health outcomes described above are, to a
large extent, the result of poor access to services, with
people largely under-utilizing the care they need. The
literature has consistently reported that geographical
barriers, due to scarcity of health facilities, and financial
barriers, due to user charges, continue to hamper access
to healthcare services [28–33].
Intervention design
The PBF program at the core of our impact evaluation
rests on the experience and knowledge acquired during
the implementation of a pre-pilot PBF intervention,
managed by the Ministry of Health (MoH) with financial
and technical assistance from the World Bank in the
period 2011–2013 in three districts (Titao, Leo, and
Boulsa). Within the framework of this early PBF interven-
tion, health facilities and the MoH entered a contractual
agreement whereby the MoH would reward the provision
of a defined service package according to a case-based
payment modality, adjusted for quality of service provision
and following verification. An independent evaluation de-
tected a positive effect of the intervention across maternal
healthcare services [34]. Program data showed improve-
ments in the quality of services provided [35].
In light of the pre-pilot experiences, the MoH, again
with financial and technical assistance from the World
Bank, decided to scale up the PBF intervention to an
additional 12 districts in early 2014. In doing so, it was
decided to test the combination of PBF with other pol-
icies under consideration for scale-up or integration into
the national health system, notably community-based
health insurance (CBHI) and user fee exemption for the
ultra-poor [36, 37].
To understand this decision, it is important to locate
the PBF program in Burkina Faso within the broader
context of PBF programs supported by the World Bank
over the course of the past decade through the Health
Results Innovation Trust Fund (HRITF), including
impact evaluations in over 20 countries, of which the
majority in Sub-Saharan Africa. Emerging preliminary
findings across the existing pilots suggested PBF’s poten-
tial to improve service provision, but pointed at PBF’s
inability to reduce inequality in service access, specific-
ally when implemented exclusively as a supply-side
intervention [38].
It is also in the light of these considerations that the
MoH and its development partners opted to implement
PBF in conjunction with a series of equity measures,
aimed at maximizing the potential of PBF to act as a
catalyst for equity changes. It is at this point, building on
the knowledge generated in other settings and looking at
the specific need to address equity gaps in the country,
that the World Bank realized the potential to use the
case of Burkina Faso to test novel financing, purchasing
and targeting mechanisms, combining elements of sup-
ply and demand side interventions into a single program.
It is also at this point that knowledge generation was
conceptualized as an intrinsic component of the PBF
program implementation and that the decision to con-
tract an independent academic institution to carry out
the impact evaluation was made. It ought to be noted, as
described in detail in the sections that follow, that the re-
search team was not involved in key intervention design
decisions (i.e. selection of intervention districts, test of
equity measures), but did contribute to shaping the evalu-
ation design as well as to elaborating the intervention de-
sign (i.e. exact design of the equity measures).
Similarly to the pre-pilot, the primary objective of the
PBF program was to improve the utilization and quality
of maternal and child health (MCH) services, in particular
among vulnerable populations such as the ultra-poor.
Effectively, however, the PBF benefit package was very
comprehensive and comprised a broad range of primary-
and secondary-level care services beyond MCH, including
also general adult curative consultations and HIV and
tuberculosis services [39]. To address the abovementioned
equity concerns, the MoH decided to implement four
different models of PBF, three of which included special
provisions to improve access to care for the ultra-poor by
explicitly alleviating the financial burden imposed by user
charges.
In detail, the following four PBF models were imple-
mented (Table 1):
PBF1: Standard PBF. PBF contracts between the MoH
and the health facilities defined the services purchased
by PBF (quantity), quality targets, and payment modal-
ities. External reviewers assessed facility reports on
quantity indicators on a monthly basis. Based on these
verified results, contracted facilities received case-based
payments for the services delivered, in addition to all
preexisting financing. PBF unit prices were calculated a
priori by the implementation team, on the basis of the
relative cost and frequency of the services provided.
Service quality was assessed with comprehensive quality
checklists, verified on a quarterly basis by the District
Health Management Teams. Facilities received an add-
itional bonus calculated on the basis of quantity out-
comes and service quality if they achieve a quality score
of initially at least 50%, later 60%. PBF payments were
intended to supplement other facility revenue in the
complex pre-existing mixed payment system [40], to
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fund expenditure, increase savings, and allow bonus pay-
ments to staff. Facilities were initially completely autono-
mous in their spending decisions. In 2017, ceilings as to
how much could be disbursed to staff were introduced
in response to undesirable practices in some facilities.
Facilities were further provided with criteria for the
distribution of bonuses among staff, including cadre,
position, seniority, work time, and performance. PBF1
did not include any specific provision to facilitate access
to care for the ultra-poor.
PBF2: Standard PBF + systematic targeting and health
service subsidization for the ultra-poor. PBF2 operated
according to the same contractual model as PBF1, but
combined it with specific provisions to facilitate access
to care for extremely vulnerable individuals residing in the
health facility catchment area. These provisions included:
a. A systematic targeting of the ultra-poor (‘indigents’)
was implemented using a community targeting ap-
proach [41], facilitated by SERSAP (Société d’Etudes
et de Recherche en Santé Publique). The aim was to
identify up to 20% of individuals residing in the
health facility catchment area and provide them
with proof of indigent status to allow them to
access all services included in the PBF benefit
package free of charge.
b. Unit prices for services delivered to the targeted
ultra-poor were adjusted to compensate for the loss
of revenues that health facilities incurred by not
charging user fees to this specific sub-population of
users. The additional payments were exclusive to
services for which direct user charges existed (e.g.
curative consultations, delivery services, family
planning), but excluded services which were already
provided free of charge (e.g. HIV and tuberculosis
testing and treatment, vaccinations).
PBF3: Standard PBF + systematic targeting and
subsidization for the ultra-poor + provider incentive to
offer services to the ultra-poor. PBF3 operated the same
PBF contracts as PBF1 and PBF2 and included the same
targeting procedures and provisions to care for the
ultra-poor as PBF2. The core difference relates to the
unit prices applied in PBF3, in that services provided to
the ultra-poor were reimbursed at a higher rate than in
PBF2 (initially at around 150% of the PBF2 prices,
reduced to an average value of 115% in 2016, with
variation across services). The idea was to compensate
for loss of income from user fees, while at the same time
offering providers an additional financial incentive to
attract and provide services to the ultra-poor. As in
PBF2, these higher reimbursement rates only pertained
to services normally offered against payment of direct
user charges at point of use.
PBF4: Traditional PBF + Community-based health in-
surance (CBHI), including targeting and subsidization
for the ultra-poor. In this case, PBF1, applying the same
contractual model as described above, was introduced in
parallel to CBHI. The insurance scheme was rolled out
with support from the NGO ASMADE, which developed
a scheme based on the model that the government had
envisioned for a future universal health insurance model
(Régime d’Assurance Maladie Universelle) [36]. ASMADE
was selected as implementing agency given its prior
experience with insurance implementation. Insurance was
offered to the entire population at a yearly premium of
3900 FCFA (~ 7 USD) per person. Targeting took place
following procedures similar to the ones used in PBF2 and
PBF3 areas and the insurance premium for the ultra-poor
was fully subsidized by the program. The insurance bene-
fit package included a wide range of primary and second-
ary healthcare services. Payments to providers were made
by both the insurance (in place of user charges) and by
the PBF program, as case-based rewards as in PBF1.
Across the four PBF models, adjustments to the quan-
tity case-based payments were made according to the
remoteness of the catchment population, staffing levels,
and distance from the district capital, so that remote and
disadvantaged facilities received higher case-based pay-
ments than easily accessible and better-equipped facil-
ities. This approach resulted in nine different possible
prices for the services incentivized by PBF, beyond the
adjustments made in PBF2 and PBF3 for services pro-
vided to the targeted ultra-poor.
The PBF program was rolled out in six regions (Centre
Nord, Centre Ouest, Nord, Sud Ouest, Boucle du Mou-
houn, and Centre Est), purposely selected by the MoH
and its development partners as having health indicators
below the national median at the onset of the interven-
tion [42]. Within each region, the MoH purposely
selected two districts to receive PBF on the basis of par-
ticularly poor outcomes on four key indicators: (i)
contraceptive prevalence rate; (ii) assisted deliveries; (iii)
antenatal consultations; and (iv) post-natal consultations.
Study design
Identifying an adequate study design for the impact
evaluation required an engagement of the main stake-
holders (including MoH, the World Bank, and the inde-
pendent impact evaluation research team) in an iterative
discussion in which policy interests were appraised
Table 1 “Intervention design”
T1: PBF T2: PBF + systematic targeting
and subsidization for the poor
T3: PBF + systematic targeting and
subsidization for the poor + additional
incentives for consultations of the poor
T4: PBF + CBHI + systematic
targeting and subsidization for
the poor
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against both scientific considerations and pragmatic im-
plementation concerns. The primary interest of the tech-
nical partners, particularly the World Bank, was to test
the added benefit of moving from the standard PBF
model to one that combined PBF with specific equity
measures. The MoH, on the other hand, was primarily
interested in identifying the overall impact of introdu-
cing PBF to generate evidence to inform future decisions
on health financing in the country.
The most straightforward design to accommodate
both interests would have been a random allocation of
all health facilities to one of the four different PBF inter-
vention models or to a control group (i.e. status quo).
This design was judged unfeasible from the policy
makers’ perspective for four reasons. First, policy makers
feared that randomization to either PBF or control
within single districts was unfeasible since districts
represent the primary operational units in the Burkinabè
decentralized healthcare system and could have there-
fore not applied different purchasing strategies across
the facilities they controlled. Second, policy makers
feared that randomization to PBF and control within a
single district might lead to conflict since the interven-
tion would be highly visible and people from control
groups could feel left behind. In addition, results from
similarly complex health interventions with full-scale
randomization report on the presence of spillover effects,
due to consumers’ mobility across facilities, to shared
management structures at the district level, and to intra-
district competition, posing a challenge to the internal
validity of the evaluations design [43, 44]. Third, the
implementation of a CBHI scheme appeared to be too
complex an intervention to be allocated randomly across
facilities in twelve districts. The level of know-how neces-
sary to facilitate insurance implementation was absent in
most districts, hence from the very onset of the discus-
sions, the government made clear its intention to test the
insurance model in conjunction with PBF exclusively in
one region, Boucle du Mouhoun, where prior experience
with insurance implementation was present [45, 46].
Fourth, it became apparent that the implementation of the
targeting component would be quite costly and that funds
would not cover its implementation across all twelve
districts.
Hence, the research team and the policy stakeholders
agreed to employ a quasi-experimental design with a
nested experimental component (Fig. 1). In practice, this
meant that within each region, two additional districts,
judged by policy stakeholders to be comparable in terms
of health indicators and health system structures, were
selected as controls. The twelve control districts received
no PBF intervention at all. Within the twelve interven-
tion districts, the four PBF packages described earlier
were implemented as follows:
Fig. 1 “PBF theory of change”
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a. In eight districts, PBF1, PBF2, and PBF3
intervention packages were randomly allocated to
health facilities and their catchment areas;
b. In two districts, PBF1 and PBF4 intervention
packages were randomly allocated to health
facilities and their catchment areas;
c. In two districts, only the PBF1 intervention package
was implemented for budgetary reasons.
Within the concerned intervention districts, facilities
were allocated across the different PBF models in
‘randomization ceremonies’, attended by all health facility
in-charges, district health managers, and other important
district and regional stakeholders to maximize transpar-
ency. During the ceremonies, after a brief introduction of
the program, health facility in-charges then took turns
drawing facility names from a box containing all health
facility names in the respective district. Starting with a
predefined PBF model, facilities were then assigned in the
order in which they were drawn from the box (i.e. 1st
facility: PBF1, 2nd facility: PBF2, 3rd facility: PBF3, 4th fa-
cility: PBF1, etc.). As referral facilities to all health centers
in the districts, the twelve district hospitals as well as the
few regional hospitals were not randomized, but rather
assigned to the PBF2 intervention package and therefore
reimbursed for user fee-free treatment of targeted poor. It
should be noted that although secondary-level facilities
were included in the intervention to ensure continuity of
care, the study focus was clearly on primary-level facilities.
This design accommodated the concerns related to
implementation complexity raised by policy makers,
while still granting the possibility to answer their re-
search questions. As explained in greater detail later, the
quasi-experimental element of the design was used to
assess the overall impact of the PBF program (irrespect-
ive of the specific intervention package) vis à vis status
quo health service provision. The experimental element
of the design was used to assess the specific added bene-
fit of introducing equity measures (as in PBF2, PBF3,
and PBF4) alongside the implementation of standard
PBF (PBF1).
It should be noted that the decision not to randomize
across all covered health facilities came at the cost of
having the study design’s statistical power to detect the
impact of PBF compared to status quo reduced, due to a
low number of clusters (defined as the districts for the
quasi-experimental component) [47]. This concern was
discussed among stakeholders already during the design
phase. An expansion of the pilot intervention to a larger
number of clusters, however, was not feasible due to
financial and pragmatic constraints. Researchers and
policy stakeholders therefore accepted this limitation,
also in light of the fact that the primary research interest
was related to the experimental component.
Study objective and research questions
The overall objective of the impact evaluation was to as-
sess the impact of the PBF program on health service
utilization and quality of service delivery across a wide
range of targeted services. As described above, the specific
focus of the impact evaluation, when compared to existing
studies [48–51], was on estimating the added benefit of
combining PBF with equity measures (i.e. either the ultra-
poor targeting and health service subsidization or the
CBHI).
The specific research questions fitting the abovemen-
tioned objectives were:
1. What is the effect of the PBF program (irrespective
of specific design model) on selected service
utilization and quality of service delivery indicators
compared to status quo service provision?
2. What is the effect of the specific PBF models (PBF1,
PBF2, PBF3, PBF4) on selected service utilization
and quality indicators compared to status quo
service provision?
3. What is the added benefit of implementing PBF2,
PBF3, and PBF4 compared to the standard PBF1 on
selected service utilization and quality indicators?
To address the equity implications embedded in the
program, for each of the abovementioned three primary
research questions, we further asked:
4. What is the effect of PBF on selected service
utilization and quality of service delivery indicators
among the very poor? What is the added benefit of
implementing PBF2, PBF3, and PBF4 beyond the
standard PBF1 among the very poor?
Theory of change
In line with the existing conceptual literature on PBF
[52–54], we postulated that the standard PBF interven-
tion (i.e. the performance contracted implemented
across all four PBF intervention packages) would affect
both quantity and quality of service provision (Fig. 1).
Specifically, we expected the combination of increased
revenues due to performance rewards, enhanced man-
agerial autonomy fostered by PBF, and intensified super-
vision on service provision to motivate healthcare
providers to actively engage to increase health service
provision (“will do”), while at the same time empowering
them with the financial and managerial means necessary
to improve quality of service delivery (“can do”). In turn,
we expected improved quality of service delivery to en-
courage communities to seek healthcare more promptly
(in spite of the fact that the Burkinabè health system still
largely relied on direct user payments at point of use
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throughout the duration of the study), further increasing
quantity of service delivery. We expected the standard
PBF intervention to be equity-neutral, i.e. not to favor
nor disfavor any specific socio-economic segment of
society.
We expected the combination of the standard PBF1
and equity measure as applied by PBF2 and PBF3 to
stimulate increases in quantity of service provision both
overall and specifically for the ultra-poor. Across both
the PBF2 and the PBF3 intervention arms, we expected
the targeted exemptions to motivate the ultra-poor to
seek healthcare more promptly and we expected this in-
creased health service utilization to narrow existing gaps
in the quantity of service delivery provided across socio-
economic groups. We expected the socio-economic gap
in quantity of service delivery to decrease more drastic-
ally in the PBF3 intervention arm, given the additional
financial incentive offered to providers to actively reach
out to the ultra-poor. In addition, given that services
were purchased at a higher value than their estimated
cost, we expected PBF3 facilities to increase their reve-
nues substantially more than PBF1 and PBF2 facilities
and in turn, we expected these additional revenues to be
deployed towards infrastructural investments, further
contributing to quality improvements in PBF3 facilities.
Similar to what we described above in relation to
PBF2 and PBF3, we postulated that the PBF4 interven-
tion package would stimulate larger increases in the
quantity of service delivery than the standard PBF1. We
expected that increased health service utilization linked
to the removal of financial barriers at point of use
(thanks to insurance) would result in higher quantities
of service delivery [55–59]. We also expected to observe
larger improvements in the quality of service delivery in
PBF4 facilities compared to PBF1 facilities, because we
expected the CBHI scheme to act as an additional inde-
pendent purchaser, exercising pressure on healthcare
providers and hence acting as an additional stimulus for
quality improvement. Given that targeting was imple-
mented in a similar fashion across PBF2, PBF3, and
PBF4 catchment areas, we expected to observe similar
equity impacts, although somewhat more pronounced in
PBF3 due to the additional provider incentive to reach
out to the targeted ultra-poor.
As addressed earlier when describing the intervention
design, the list of incentivized services was identical
across all four intervention models and it was very com-
prehensive, effectively covering almost the entirety of the
essential package of services at primary and secondary
levels. Hence, we did not expect healthcare providers in
PBF1 and PBF4 to focus their efforts on specific services,
simply because the payment structure was not set in a
way as to offer any incentive to privilege some services
above others. In the PBF2 and PBF3 intervention arm,
however, the additional payments to compensate for loss
of revenues from user fees and the additional financial
incentive to treat the ultra-poor in PBF3 were exclusively
tied to services normally offered against payment of
direct user charges at point of use. Consequently, we
expected that, when treating the very poor, providers
would have an incentive to provide services for which
they receive both the standard PBF payment and the
additional compensation related to the attended loss of
income from user fees/additional financial incentive
(such as curative consultations) rather than services for
which they received only the standard PBF payment
(such as vaccination or antenatal care (ANC)). There-
fore, in PBF2 and PBF3 facilities, we expected to observe
an overall greater increase in case volume as well as a
more remarkable equity improvement specifically for
these services for which additional compensation was
offered.
Across the four PBF models, we expected increases in
the quantity and quality of service provision to result in
improved health status, especially among women and
children, given that most indicators targeted MCH ser-
vices. We did not expect the intervention to produce
measurable changes in mortality patterns over its short
implementation period, but we did expect the improved
health service delivery resulting from PBF to be able to
produce changes in simpler health status indicators,
such as those related to anemia and acute malnutrition.
Outcome indicators
Table 2 contains the set of main outcome indicators
selected for our impact evaluation. In their selection, we
took into account the above-described theory of change,
including indicators at the different levels, the list of in-
centivized services, national and international standards,
as well as data availability, quality and baseline values. In
alignment with the focus of the study, the set of main
outcome indicators pertains exclusively to the primary
level of care.
Data sources and data collection tools
The impact evaluation relied on two main sources of data:
i. a household survey, conducted at baseline (October
2013–March 2014) and endline (April–June 2017); ii. a
facility-based survey, also conducted at baseline and end-
line, including different data collection tools: a health
facility assessment, a health worker survey, direct
provider-patient observations (ANC and curative ser-
vices for children under the age of 5 (U5)), and patient exit
interviews (ANC, U5 curative services, and curative ser-
vices to patients aged five or older). In addition, we used
data from the routine health management information
system (HMIS) to triangulate results obtained with pri-
mary data, and to estimate impact on indicators for which
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Table 2 Main impact evaluation outcome indicator set
INDICATOR DATA SOURCE
Indicators pertaining to human resources
1 Proportion of staff having been evaluated for their performance in last year Health worker survey
2 Health workers’ perceived individual agency
3 Health workers’ satisfaction with the physical work environment
4 Health workers’ satisfaction with their compensation
5 Health workers’ satisfaction with management and supervision
6 Health workers’ intrinsic motivation
Indicators pertaining to health service quality
7 Proportion of facilities with permanent availability of power and safe water in
the last 7 days
Health facility
assessment
8 Proportion of facilities with at least one unit of 23 essential drugs in stock
9 Proportion of facilities with availability and functionality of key equipment for
consultations of children under 5
10 Proportion of facilities with availability and functionality of key equipment for ANC
11 Proportion of facilities with availability and functionality of key equipment for delivery
12 Proportion of observed ANC cases having received three key routine ANC services Direct observation
13 Proportion of observed ANC cases having received patient education on three key
elements
14 Proportion of children observed in curative consultations having been assessed for
all IMCI danger signs
Direct observation
15 Proportion of children observed in curative consultations having been assessed for
common childhood illness symptoms according to IMCI
16a Proportion of ANC clients perceiving adequate quality of care on seven key elements Exit interview
16b Proportion of U5 consultation clients perceiving adequate quality of care on seven
key elements
Exit interview
16c Proportion of curative consultation clients aged 5 or older perceiving adequate quality
of care on seven key elements
Exit interview
Indicators pertaining to the utilization of reproductive health care services
17 Proportion of recently pregnant women with at least four ANC visits Household survey
18 Proportion of recently pregnant women with an ANC visit within first four months of
pregnancy
19 Proportion of recently pregnant women having received at least 2 doses of tetanus
vaccine during pregnancy
20 Proportion of recently pregnant women having been offered HIV testing during
pregnancy
21 Number of HIV-positive mothers who have completed prophylactic ARV treatment HMIS
22 Proportion of recently pregnant women who have delivered in a formal health facility Household survey
23 Proportion of recently pregnant women with at least one PNC visit within 6 weeks
after delivery
24 Proportion of recently pregnant women with at least three PNC visits within 6 weeks
after delivery
25 Proportion of non-pregnant women aged 15–49 who use modern family planning methods
Indicators pertaining to the utilization of preventive child health services
26 Proportion of children aged 12–23 months who are fully immunized (primary data) Household survey
27 Proportion of children aged 0–11months who have participated in growth monitoring
in last 6 months (primary data)
28 Proportion of children aged 12–23 months who have participated in growth monitoring
in last 6 months
Indicators pertaining to the utilization of curative health care services
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our sampling strategy did not generate a sufficiently large
sample, namely health care utilization for acute illness and
ART for prevention of mother-to-child transmission. We
pooled the respective six months of routine data before
the primary baseline and endline data collections and
treated the resulting data points the same way as the pri-
mary data in the analyses described in the following.
To collect primary data, we used a slightly revised ver-
sion of the data collection tool set included in the
HRITF impact evaluation toolkit [60] tailored to the
needs of this specific impact evaluation and to the Burki-
nabé context. Table 3 illustrates the content of each data
collection tool employed in our impact evaluation.
Data collection teams spent one day at each sampled
health facility and village, collecting data partially on
paper (facility-based survey) and partially electronically
(household survey) at baseline, and fully electronically at
endline. In order to ensure efficient data collection, field
supervisors travelled ahead of their teams to observe so-
cial protocols, finalize sampling before arrival of the data
collection team, and ensure availability of interview part-
ners. An independent quality assurance control of the
endline data collection process was commissioned to the
Institut de Recherche en Sciences de la Santé (IRSS),
Burkina Faso.
Sample and data collection procedures
Our sampling strategy seeked to cover all health facilities
and their attached catchment areas included in the inter-
vention at baseline. Ideally, we would have liked panel
data for all indicators, with the same units measured at
baseline and endline, to ensure a maximally robust
Table 2 Main impact evaluation outcome indicator set (Continued)
INDICATOR DATA SOURCE
29 Number of patients under age 5 having sought curative services HMIS
30 Number of patients age 5 or older having sought curative services
Indicators pertaining to population health status
31 Proportion of children aged 0–59months who are severely stunted Household survey
32 Proportion of children aged 0–59months with severe acute malnutrition
33 Proportion of children aged 6–59months with anemia
34 Proportion of women aged 15–49 years with anemia
An equity analysis was possible for all health care utilization and health status indicators for which data stems from the household survey, but not for indicators
based on HMIS data. No equity analysis was possible for quality of care or human resources indicators
Table 3 Data collection tools and sources
Data collection tool Data source Description of Data
Household survey Household head or representative Household demographic and socio-economic profile,
deaths in the 10 prior years
Household survey All household members Chronic conditions and health service use; health service
use for acute conditions in the 4 weeks preceding the
survey (incl. expenditure)
Household survey Currently pregnant women and women who
have ended a pregnancy in the 24 prior months
Pregnancy and birth history, use of reproductive health
services (incl. costs), perceptions of health service quality
Household survey Children under 5 Immunization status, use of growth
monitoring services
Household survey Women of reproductive age, children under 5 Rapid diagnostic tests for malaria & anemia, height and
weight measurements
Facility assessment Facility in-charge Service availability, administrative information (including
finances), staffing, infrastructure, availability of infrastructure,
equipment, drugs, and consumables
Health worker survey Skilled health care personnel Training, clinical knowledge, compensation, supervision,
motivation, satisfaction, perceived working conditions
Direct observation Antenatal care consultations, curative consultations
for children under 5
Case management, treatment and counseling provided
Patient exit interview Patients exiting from antenatal care consultations,
curative consultations for children under 5, and
curative consultations for patients aged 5 and older
Patient’s (or caretaker’s) perception of quality of care and
satisfaction, socio-economic information
HMIS Health facilities Patient counts per service category from the routine health
management information system
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impact estimation. However, this was only partially pos-
sible, as explained below.
Health facility survey
The health facility survey was conducted in all public
and private primary- and secondary-level health facilities
in the intervention districts providing essential repro-
ductive and child care services, as well as a random
sample of health facilities in the control districts for an
intervention-control facility ratio of approximately 3:1.
This amounted to a total of 537 primary- and 24
secondary-level facilities in the 24 intervention and con-
trol districts surveyed at both baseline and at endline.
The health facility sample was therefore a fully balanced
panel. Health facilities newly opened in intervention dis-
tricts between baseline and endline were included in the
PBF intervention, but not in the impact evaluation
sample.
Health facility assessments were conducted in all
health facilities included in the sample. In primary care
facilities, the health worker survey was applied to all
clinical skilled healthcare staff available on the day of the
visit. Random sampling from all staff on payroll or a
census was not feasible for reasons of time and
budget. Due to high staff turnover and for the same
budgetary and time reasons, it was not possible to sys-
tematically reinterview baseline respondents at end-
line. At secondary facilities, the health worker survey
was administered to a random sample of three health
workers with maternal and child health service delivery
responsibilities. At all facilities where ANC services were
provided on the day of the interviewer team visit, five
direct provider-patient observations of ANC consultations
were performed. Specifically, interviewers were
instructed to observe the first five consultations as ran-
dom sampling was not feasible for pragmatic reasons.
Similarly, five direct provider-patient observations for
U5 curative consultations presenting with a new condi-
tion were performed at all health facilities included in
the sample. We further performed exit interviews with
the observed patients (or their caregivers) for both ser-
vice categories (ANC, U5 curative services), as well as
with five curative consultation patients aged five and
above at each sampled health facility. As observations
and exit interviews depended on the patients naturally
presenting on the day of data collection, the construc-
tion of a panel at this level was not possible.
Household survey
One village was randomly selected from the catchment
area of each of the 523 public primary health care facil-
ities included in the intervention. Since the secondary
and few private facilities do not have an own catchment
area, we could not sample a specific village at their level.
The same villages were visited at baseline and endline,
resulting in a fully balanced panel at the village level. In
each selected village, at baseline, we randomly selected
15 households among all households with at least one
currently pregnant woman or at least one woman having
ended a pregnancy (irrespective of outcome) within the
prior 24 months. Eligible households were identified
through a preliminary comprehensive listing of all
households in the selected villages, conducted by the
same field enumerators who later administered the sur-
vey. This sampling criterion was chosen to allow obtain-
ing sufficiently large sample sizes for the key indicators
of interest (i.e. utilization and quality of maternal and
child health care services) at much lower cost than with
a fully representative population sample, which would
have exceeded the budget available. We are aware that
such a sample, which is not fully representative of the
population in the concerned districts, limits our ability
to approach research questions not directly pertaining to
MCH.
At endline, we organized data collection at the house-
hold level in such a way as to create, at least to the
extent possible, a partial panel. Hence, we first returned
to baseline households at endline. If they still fulfilled
the abovementioned sampling criterion, they were in-
cluded in the endline survey. If not, they were replaced
with the nearest household meeting the above-outlined
eligibility criteria. Our expectation was that a relatively
large share of baseline households would still be eligible
at endline, given high fertility rates in Burkina Faso and
a three-year lag period between baseline and endline.
However, we could identify and include in the endline
household sample only 53% of baseline households,
while 38% were no longer eligible, 5% could not be
traced again and 4% were still eligible, but refused to
participate again. Additional analyses showed that while
the partial panel introduced some selection bias to our
sample (slightly higher fertility in panel households), the
bias was constant across study groups, and no other
observable systematic differences between panel and
non-panel households and individuals were apparent.
Analytical approach
While keeping alignment with the overall HRITF analyt-
ical framework and strategy, our analytical approach had
to accommodate the specific nature of our study design,
research questions, and data structure. In line with what
was described earlier in this manuscript, we nested an
experimental component within a broader quasi-
experimental design to deliberately address the know-
ledge needs raised by the different policy stakeholders.
As we had a balanced panel only at the health facility/
village level, but not at the health worker, patient,
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household, and household member levels, where the ma-
jority of key indicators was measured, we could not con-
duct observation-level panel analyses, and therefore
treated the baseline and endline samples as repeated
cross-sections. Important to note is that this is not ne-
cessarily a specific weakness of our study, but rather the
norm in studies pertaining to health system interven-
tions [61].
We employed a Difference-in-Differences (DID) ap-
proach to identify the impact of PBF compared to status
quo and the added benefit of the equity measures in
PBF2, PBF3, and PBF4 compared to the standard PBF1.
In DID, the intervention effect is estimated as the differ-
ence between the baseline-endline change in the inter-
vention group and the control group. DID thereby
isolates the intervention effect from baseline differences
between the study groups, as well as from secular trends
over time [47]. In contrast to our nested experiment,
where impact estimates can be identified through a
simple difference approach, causal inference in our
quasi-experimental setting makes a DID approach neces-
sary. In our specific case, we indeed observed significant
differences between the intervention and control group
on certain indicators at baseline, which are likely driven
by the purposive way in which intervention and control
districts were selected. We also observed secular positive
and negative trends on many indicators, in light of gen-
eral developments in the country and diverse national
efforts and policies, most notably the exemption policy
targeting pregnant and lactating women and children
under five (the ‘politique de gratuité’) introduced nation-
ally in June 2016.
DID relies on two main assumptions: 1) the ‘parallel
trend assumption’ that intervention and control units of
observations would have in fact developed in the same
manner in the absence of the treatment; and 2) the ‘stable
unit treatment value assumption’ that each unit of obser-
vation was clearly either exposed to the treatment or not
(i.e. no spillover) and that treatment was uniform across
all units assigned to it (i.e. no contamination) [47]. To the
extent possible, we aimed to validate these two assump-
tions with additionally collected information and data. In
regards to 1), using HMIS, we found uniformity of pre-in-
tervention trends among the different study groups on the
indicators pertaining to health care utilization, strengthen-
ing our confidence in the control districts as an appropri-
ate approximation of the counterfactual. In regards to 2),
we systematically collected information on other interven-
tions on-going and newly introduced in the intervention
period. While the collected information did not allow us
to adjust the models directly, it helped us in the interpret-
ation of resulting effect estimates.
For each of the indicators included in our impact
evaluation, we specified three different DID models to
address research questions 1 to 3. All analyses described
below were applied exclusively to primary-level facilities.
The twelve secondary-level facilities included in our sam-
ple were excluded from analysis due to lack of comparable
controls. The panel structure of the data at the facility/vil-
lage level allowed us to strengthen the precision of our es-
timations through the inclusion of facility/village fixed
effects in the models, thereby controlling for time-
invariant unobserved differences across health facilities/
villages. Moreover, as an additional robustness test, we
also estimated all effects relying only on the partial panel
subsamples at the individual and household level.
Given the specific equity focus of the impact evalu-
ation (research question 4), for all indicators relying on
household data we additionally performed all analyses
with the subsample that contains only units from the
lowest socio-economic quintile. This reflects an Intention-
to-Treat (ITT) approach, measuring changes at the
population level (e.g. “How has health service utilization
changed in areas where a targeting of the ultra-poor had
taken place, as opposed to areas where only the standard
PBF1 was implemented?”) rather than at the individual
level (e.g. “How has being selected as indigent changed
health service utilization behavior?”). The latter would
have been very interesting to explore, but was not possible
within the standard HRITF methodology for PBF impact
evaluations. Specifically, it would have required a full
panel at the household member level and a substantially
larger sample size to capture a sufficiently high number of
individuals in the demographic groups relevant to the
main indicators of interest at baseline who would later be
selected as ultra-poor as the project rolled out.
DID model specification
First, to answer research question 1, we relied on the
quasi-experimental design component and compared all
PBF facilities/villages (pooled across all intervention
arms) to control facilities/villages, leading to the follow-
ing regression equation:
Ydfit ¼ α f þ β  2017t þ δ  PBFd2017t½  þ ϕ  Xit
þ ϵdfit ;
where Ydfit is the outcome variable for individual i from
facility/village f in district d at time t with t = {2014,
2017}. 2017t is a dummy variable indicating endline ob-
servations, thus coefficient β gives the time fixed effect.
PBFd is a dummy variable that equals one for individuals
in PBF districts and zero for individuals in control dis-
tricts. αf are facility/village fixed effects, and Xit is a set
of additional individual-level covariates as relevant to the
respective indicator (i.e. health worker, patient, house-
hold member, and/or caregiver characteristics). ϵdfit is
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the error term. Following common practice, standard
errors were clustered at the district level, which is the
level of treatment assignment for the quasi-experimental
component of the study design [47]. The coefficient δ
gives the DID estimate for the effect of being located in
a PBF district when compared to non-PBF districts.
Second, to answer research question 2, we relied on
the quasi-experimental design component, but com-
pared single PBF intervention arms to the controls. This
leads to the following regression equation:
Ydfit ¼ α f þ β  2017t þ
X4
k¼1δk
 PBFkd2017t
 þ ϕ  Xit þ ϵdfit ; ð1Þ
where PBFkd is are dummy variables that equal one for
individuals from facilities/village in treatment arm PBFk,
where k = {1,2,3,4}. Individuals from facilities/village in
control districts provide the comparison group. The DID
estimates δk give the effects of PBFk in comparison to
status quo (control districts). The remaining equation
components are equal to specification 1. Note that as in
specification 1, standard errors were clustered at the
district level, the level of treatment assignment.
Third, to answer research question 3, we relied on the
experimental design component (randomized controlled
trial) nested within the quasi-experiment and compared
the PBF arms with built-in equity measures (PBF2,
PBF3, and PBF4) to the standard PBF (PBF1). For this
exercise we had to estimate two separate regression
equations; eq. 2b to compare PBF4 to PBF1 in the two
districts of Boucle du Mouhoun, where the combination
of insurance and PBF and PBF alone had been randomly
assigned across facilities, and eq. 2a to compare PBF2
and PBF3 to PBF1 in the eight remaining districts:
Yfit ¼ α f þ β  2017t þ δ2  T2 f 2017t
 þ δ3
 T3 f 2017t
 þ ϕ  Xit þ ϵfit ð2aÞ
Yfit ¼ α f þ β  2017t þ δ4  T4 f 2017t
 þ ϕ
 Xit þ ϵfit ð2bÞ
where Yfit is the outcome variable for individual i from
facility/village f at time t with t = {2013, 2017} in the
intervention districts. In this set of analyses, standard
errors were clustered at health facility/village level, the
level at which random assignment into the four PBF
models took place. δ2 and δ3 give the DID estimate for
the effect of being located in PBF2 compared to PBF1
and PBF3 compared to PBF1, respectively. δ4 gives the
DiD estimate for the effect of being located in PBF4
compared to PBF1.
By design, the quasi-experimental study component is
challenged by a relatively low number of clusters (24 dis-
tricts), as it was not possible to randomize intervention
and control facilities at facility level. Too few clusters
might lead to the estimation of downward-biased
standard errors and, consequently, to an over-rejection
of the null hypothesis that there is no program effect.
Thus, there is an elevated risk of postulating significant
program effects when there is actually no effect detect-
able with the design. There appears to be no consensus
in the literature yet as to which number of clusters is
sufficient, but 24 clusters are on the lower end of the
spectrum of sufficiency in available simulation studies
[62, 63]. Further, studies have shown that the implica-
tions of too few clusters are considerably worse when
clusters are strongly imbalanced in terms of within-
cluster sample sizes as it is unfortunately the case in
our study design [64, 65]. The available literature
proposes several robustness tests [62, 66]. In a simula-
tion study, Cameron, Gelbach and Miller [63] investi-
gated different recently suggested bootstrapping
methods to obtain asymptotic refinement in a scenario
with as few as five clusters. They found that the ‘wild
bootstrap’ can considerably improve statistical infer-
ence of the coefficient estimate and produces much
lower over-rejection rates of the H0 than, for instance,
the common practice of bootstrapping standard errors.
Following this literature, as a robustness test, we ap-
plied the ‘wild bootstrap’ to all specification 1 models.
In contrast to bootstrapping standard errors, the ‘wild
bootstrap’ involves a bootstrap t-procedure [67], where
the Wald statistic is bootstrapped, and where the
resulting distribution of the Wald statistic is used to
confirm or reject inference on the original Wald statis-
tic obtained in the DID regressions.
Discussion
In this paper, we described the study design and the ana-
lytical approach adopted to evaluate a complex health
intervention, the health-sector PBF program rolled out
since 2014 in Burkina Faso. Our wish has been that of
illustrating the way we reconciled scientific and prag-
matic concerns to generate policy-relevant evidence on
the intervention’s impact, which is methodologically
rigorous in its identification strategy but also considerate
of the context within which the intervention took place.
In particular, we highlighted how we formulated the re-
search questions, ultimately leading to our design
choices, on the basis of the knowledge needs expressed
by the policy and implementing stakeholders. Moreover,
we emphasized how knowledge needs differed across
stakeholders and how the wish to accommodate these dif-
ferences and meet all expectations led us to combine ex-
perimental and quasi-experimental methods into a single
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study design. Since most of the evaluation literature, both
methodological and applied, presents one approach at a
time (either experimental or quasi-experimental), we trust
that our work can be useful for other researchers facing
similar challenges when trying to accommodate multiple
knowledge needs and to adjust a research design to the
realities within which an intervention takes place.
In describing our study design, we have aimed to be
very transparent about its methodological weaknesses
resulting in particular from the inability to randomize
intervention and control within the same districts or en-
large the district sample, the inability to construct panels
at the level of unit of observation for most indicators,
and potential contamination by various concurrent inter-
ventions. Since we have already discussed these challenges
and our approaches to addressing them above, we will not
reiterate them here. What we wish to highlight here is the
fact that all major methodological challenges were beyond
our capacity to influence as researchers. In this paper, we
showed how we worked ex-post to address them to the
best extent possible to ensure maximal accuracy and cred-
ibility of our findings.
In conclusion, our experience makes a case for the feasi-
bility of combining quasi-experimental and experimental
approaches within a single study design to address mul-
tiple knowledge needs and, at the same time, respect local
wishes pertaining to implementation practices. However,
our experience also shows that compared to a standard
randomized trial, such a nested approach is likely to
involve certain methodological compromises and implica-
tions thereof, which are only partially addressable at the
analytical stage. In particular, our lessons learned include
the importance of an early and in-depth discussion about
the advantages and disadvantages of different design
options with all involved stakeholders, to agree on a
common set of priorities and streamline expectations; to
construct panels if anyhow possible; and to collect
additional data and information allowing to test assump-
tions and deepen contextual understanding.
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